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"The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism," Philosophical Studies (2021) (preprint / published version)
I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind and metaethics to show that the reasoning employed in an important argument for panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in metaethics: panmoralism. Next, I raise a number of problems for panmoralism and thereby build a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument for panpsychism. Finally, I contrast panmoralism with a position recently defended by Einar Duenger Bohn and argue that the two suffer from similar problems. I conclude by drawing some general lessons for panpsychism.
Title removed for blind review
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But how is that thesis to be understood? Several philosophers have attempted to illuminate the thesis of physicalism by appealing to a modal notion of supervenience. However, supervenience formulations of physicalism face a number of problems. Some fail to respect the thought that physicalism is a contingent thesis. Others also have counterintuitive consequences when adapted to define restricted physicalist views, such as physicalism about the mind. Finally, they are all compatible with paradigmatically anti-physicalist views, such as theism. In this paper, I draw on the notion of metaphysical ground to provide a novel definition of physicalism that avoids these problems.
Title removed for blind review
Recently, it has been suggested that the notion of (metaphysical) ground has an important role to play in developing physicalism about mentality. For there are reasons to think that Grounding Physicalism About Mentality (GPM) has advantages over traditional reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism about mentality. In this paper, I argue that a new spin on an old objection to physicalism--that it leaves an "explanatory gap"—undermines the enthusiasm for GPM. I start by arguing that truths about the essences of things have an important role to play in explaining certain grounding phenomena. I then argue that this ultimately creates a dilemma for GPM: either GPM leaves a distinctive explanatory gap, or it collapses into a version of reductive physicalism.
"The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Revisited"
The phenomenal concept strategy for defending physicalism against the knowledge argument is to substitute a dualism of concepts for a dualism of properties. The idea is that when Mary sees a red object for the first time, she acquires a phenomenal concept for the experience of red. But what is a phenomenal concept? To answer this question, Balog, Block, and Papineau have independently developed a quotational-indexical account according to which phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. However, Michael Tye has argued against the phenomenal concept strategy, and it is unclear whether the quotational-indexical account can overcome his objections. I show how the quotational-indexical account can handle Tye’s objections by making a crucial concession. I then argue that once this concession is made, the account can no longer address the knowledge argument. I conclude that if the phenomenal concept strategy depends on the quotational-indexical account, then it fails.
"Some Puzzles About Reasons (And How To Solve Them)"
Many philosophers working in metaethics accept what I call the Relational View (RV). According to RV, the predicates "is a reason for" and "counts in favor of" express a relation—the favoring-relation—that holds between a consideration and a response. But it has gone unacknowledged that RV gives rise to a number of puzzles. The puzzles can be summarized with a single question: What, exactly, is favored in a favoring-relation? The answer may seem obvious: a response. But a moment's reflection shows that this answer is unsatisfying. For when agents respond to their reasons, they perform actions, concrete particulars, whereas before they act, no such particulars exist. This might prompt us to say that acting in a way is favored, yet this suggestion does little to clarify the relationship between what agents have reason to do (act in a way) and what they in fact do (perform actions). I develop the puzzles in detail and propose a common solution.
I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind and metaethics to show that the reasoning employed in an important argument for panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in metaethics: panmoralism. Next, I raise a number of problems for panmoralism and thereby build a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument for panpsychism. Finally, I contrast panmoralism with a position recently defended by Einar Duenger Bohn and argue that the two suffer from similar problems. I conclude by drawing some general lessons for panpsychism.
Title removed for blind review
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. But how is that thesis to be understood? Several philosophers have attempted to illuminate the thesis of physicalism by appealing to a modal notion of supervenience. However, supervenience formulations of physicalism face a number of problems. Some fail to respect the thought that physicalism is a contingent thesis. Others also have counterintuitive consequences when adapted to define restricted physicalist views, such as physicalism about the mind. Finally, they are all compatible with paradigmatically anti-physicalist views, such as theism. In this paper, I draw on the notion of metaphysical ground to provide a novel definition of physicalism that avoids these problems.
Title removed for blind review
Recently, it has been suggested that the notion of (metaphysical) ground has an important role to play in developing physicalism about mentality. For there are reasons to think that Grounding Physicalism About Mentality (GPM) has advantages over traditional reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism about mentality. In this paper, I argue that a new spin on an old objection to physicalism--that it leaves an "explanatory gap"—undermines the enthusiasm for GPM. I start by arguing that truths about the essences of things have an important role to play in explaining certain grounding phenomena. I then argue that this ultimately creates a dilemma for GPM: either GPM leaves a distinctive explanatory gap, or it collapses into a version of reductive physicalism.
"The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Revisited"
The phenomenal concept strategy for defending physicalism against the knowledge argument is to substitute a dualism of concepts for a dualism of properties. The idea is that when Mary sees a red object for the first time, she acquires a phenomenal concept for the experience of red. But what is a phenomenal concept? To answer this question, Balog, Block, and Papineau have independently developed a quotational-indexical account according to which phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. However, Michael Tye has argued against the phenomenal concept strategy, and it is unclear whether the quotational-indexical account can overcome his objections. I show how the quotational-indexical account can handle Tye’s objections by making a crucial concession. I then argue that once this concession is made, the account can no longer address the knowledge argument. I conclude that if the phenomenal concept strategy depends on the quotational-indexical account, then it fails.
"Some Puzzles About Reasons (And How To Solve Them)"
Many philosophers working in metaethics accept what I call the Relational View (RV). According to RV, the predicates "is a reason for" and "counts in favor of" express a relation—the favoring-relation—that holds between a consideration and a response. But it has gone unacknowledged that RV gives rise to a number of puzzles. The puzzles can be summarized with a single question: What, exactly, is favored in a favoring-relation? The answer may seem obvious: a response. But a moment's reflection shows that this answer is unsatisfying. For when agents respond to their reasons, they perform actions, concrete particulars, whereas before they act, no such particulars exist. This might prompt us to say that acting in a way is favored, yet this suggestion does little to clarify the relationship between what agents have reason to do (act in a way) and what they in fact do (perform actions). I develop the puzzles in detail and propose a common solution.